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Abstract
In this paper, we draw attention to the role of synergies inmarine conservation and community sustainability. Usingmarine protected
areas (MPAs) as examples, we argue that MPAs that are carefully designed to fit the existing social systems can be instrumental in
synergy building and fostering community development. Such synergy creation is an essential governance strategy that helps
enhance governability as it reduces conflicts and provides opportunities for constructive cooperation among stakeholders, especially
in times of crisis. We illustrate this using the case of La Restinga MPA in the Canary Islands. Based on data and experiences from
long-term research programs on coastal communities in the Canary Islands in general, and La Restinga in particular, we discuss the
functions of the MPA in the local contexts and describe how the MPA has transformed relationships and interactions among
stakeholders, leading to different levels of synergies. While some of the interactions have not been conducive to the implementation
of the MPA, strong synergies have been created, especially after the volcano eruption. The story of La Restinga offers valuable
lessons about the way the community copes and responds to change, and the role that synergies play in the process.
Keywords Sustainable development goals . Marine protected areas . Synergy . Small-scale fisheries . Coastal tourism .
Governability
Introduction
Community sustainability in the face of environmental degrada-
tion and, in some instances, crises, is an urgent concern in global
discourses. As countries aim to achieve Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), several policy measures have
emerged, though not always accompanied by strategies that ac-
tually foster their implementation. A holistic approach has been
promoted based on the recognition of the need for comprehen-
sive strategies. Yet, such an approach may sometimes be more
effective if it was based on a systemic understanding of social
and ecological interactions. Specifically, there is a need to exam-
ine the degree to which such interactions can lead to synergies
among different activities and actors in concrete circumstances.
A case in point is about the use of marine protected areas
(MPAs) as a means to achieve SDG14 (Life Below Water) that
argues for a holistic perspective to underlie their design and
establishment. Lessons from the implementation of MPAs
around the world suggest that they do not always succeedmainly
because they do not pay sufficient attention to social interactions
and impacts. Inmany instances,MPAs end up creating animosity
and resistance in communities and among stakeholders. The dis-
cussion about MPA implementation in the context of SDGs
would benefit from an examination of how MPAs interact with
communities in ways that may foster or hinder synergies.
Synergy is a concept that has been used to explain socio-
logical interactions, both as an outcome and as a means
through which more constructive relationships are fostered.
We can see this in the way neighborhoods are established
and organized, especially in small- and medium-sized cities,
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where local residents build networks to facilitate their collec-
tive interests and actions. Similarly, in business, the idea about
the merits of industrial clusters (Porter 1998) is based on the
assumption that bringing enterprises closer together geograph-
ically and organizationally would be mutually beneficial,
more so than if they were to operate individually and indepen-
dently. In the context of interactive governance (Kooiman et
al. 2005), synergy is a possible outcome of interactions that
occur between the governing system and the system that it
aims to govern, as well as internally to both systems.
Although such outcomes may be observed in concrete cases,
they are not always easy to explain or describe how exactly
they come about. This prevents the active use of synergy as a
strategy for implementing policy measures, like MPAs, to
achieve major goals like SDGs.
While not the only tool, many consider MPAs as one of the
obvious solutions to addressing global sustainability concerns
(Fenberg et al. 2012; Wood et al. 2008; Halpern and Warner
2002).MPAs are thus positioned as themain vehicle to achieving
SDG14 (https://oceanconference.un.org/callforaction).
Ambitious plans for their establishment are made at all levels.
The Convention for Biological Diversity (CBD) has proposed
Aichi Target 11, encouraging countries to set aside 10% of coast-
al and marine spaces as protected areas by 2020 (see https://
www.cbd.int/sp/targets/rationale/target-11/). In Europe, the
Natura 2000, the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, and
the OSPAR convention are promoting their establishment.
Spain is among the countries in Europe where MPAs are high
on the agenda. Research shows, however, that people whose
livelihoods are affected by the MPAs may not be so supportive,
hence reducing their governability (Jentoft et al. 2011; Bavinck et
al. 2013; Christie and White 2007; McClanahan et al. 2005).
People affected by MPAs tend to see MPAs less as a solution
but more as a problem, interfering with what they normally do,
for instance, in order to sustain themselves (Segi 2014).
However, MPAs do not have to be detrimental to the sus-
tainability of small-scale fisheries and their communities, pro-
viding that they are properly conceived, carefully designed,
and well implemented (Chuenpagdee et al. 2013; Pomeroy et
al. 2007). We argue here that, given the right approach, espe-
cially with an attention to the pre-implementation phase, they
could provide positive stimuli by creating synergies within
and across sectors. MPAs may be instituted in ways that sup-
port small-scale fisheries, while mobilizing the latter for a
conservation agenda. They can also help promote other
income-generating activities such as marine tourism, and thus
benefit communities as a whole (Biggs et al. 2016). The
“trick,” we argue, is to facilitate the symbiosis between di-
verse marine users and sectors that may otherwise be in con-
flict, as seen for instance in the case of the Philippines (Fabinyi
2008). However, such symbiosis does not necessarily emerge
automatically but needs deliberate planning, interventions,
and negotiation among stakeholders (Oyanedel et al. 2016).
The aim of this paper is to explore how synergies can occur
in a context of an MPA in La Restinga, in El Hierro, an island
in the Canary Island Archipelago of Spain. Contrary to the
general experience (Christie 2004; Chuenpagdee et al.
2013), the MPA was received positively among most stake-
holders exactly because of the synergies it fostered. In this
case, the synergy attained helped create resilience in times of
crisis and has proven to be a basis for community sustainabil-
ity. Along with other communities in the archipelago, La
Restinga has been a focus of study since the 1980s by natural
and social scientists from the University of La Laguna. These
projects and numerous publications have provided insights
and the long-term perspective of the social transformation
occurring in the coastal areas, and where the introduction of
MPAs has played an important role.
Established in 1996, La RestingaMPAwasmeant to be a tool
not only for environmental conservation but also for sustainable
small-scale fisheries development. Thus, it falls within the IUCN
category VI - Protected area with sustainable use of natural
resources. Although officially named a “Marine Reserve of
Fishing Interest” (Revenga 2003; Jentoft et al. 2012), this paper
uses the generic term MPA to refer to this protected area. Here,
the nature and types of relationships and interactions between
small-scale fisheries, tourism, and conservation have provided
opportunities for synergy creation around the MPA. Though
fishing takes place in other areas of El Hierro, La Restinga is
considered the “only fishing community” and the principal fish-
ing port on the island. It is a holiday destination for Canarians
and is increasingly known internationally for scuba diving. In
2011, La Restinga experienced an underwater volcanic eruption,
massively affecting both fisheries and tourism, and testing the
resilience and sustainability of the local community. The role of
the MPA in facilitating synergies, especially after the disaster, is
the focus of this paper.
In the following sections, we introduce the concept of syn-
ergy in the context of governability. Next, we describe La
Restinga’s small-scale fishing community and discuss the
relationships among stakeholders and with the MPA.
Lessons for other MPAs form the concluding arguments on
strategies for building synergy, and by implication, supporting
the implementation of the SDGs and the CBD targets.
Synergy for governability
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) define synergy as a circumstance
when doing more of one activity increases the return on other
related activities. It is the “plus” that mutually supportive ac-
tivities bring when considered in tandem, in addition to their
contributions being taken individually, i.e., when two plus two
equals five. In this instance, synergy is built upon compatibil-
ity of concerted effort and cooperation. As has been shown in
“employment system theory” (Jentoft and Wadel 1984;
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Sønvisen et al. 2011), when synergy in organizations and
communities occurs, it leads to constructive outcomes and
helps build relationships. A synergistic interaction is advanta-
geous: when people cooperate, they may be able to do more than
they can accomplish when acting alone, reducing the prevalence
of internal conflicts. They may also be able to cope better when
faced with external threats and risks, including those induced by
nature. In the absence of such cooperation, conflict and paralysis
may occur, in away that inhibits the realization of synergy.While
synergetic relationships help to create virtuous circles, negative
ones may generate self-reinforcing, vicious circles of antago-
nism. Yet, it is also possible for conflict, confrontation, and com-
petition to have a positive function, eventually bringing about
progress, as Coser argues (1956). Turning these opposing rela-
tionships into positive synergy is about looking for opportunities
that may exist, through a careful examination of all aspects of the
governance system, including the natural and the social systems
that are being governed, and the governing system (Kooiman et
al. 2005). Enhancing governability in fisheries is about finding
ways to nurture synergy and supportive actions, turning an
existing or potential conflict into one of cooperation, and creating
unity out of division.
Thus, synergy in personal or institutional relationships and
hence governability, i.e., the overall governance quality of the
entire system (Kooiman 2003), may be created through gover-
nance intervention, either from within or driven by external
forces, including governments, as a form of hierarchical gover-
nance. Self-governance, by means of local level organizations
such as a cooperative, may help bring positive interactions and
build social capital for later use. Experience, whether negative or
positive, may also create institutional learning, which may in-
crease the capacity of governing actors to create synergy. In some
instances, communities become paralyzed in their conflicts and
need external interventions in various forms, including legal,
from governments or other non-local actors, in order to move
on. Existing relationships and patterns of interaction may in
themselves represent an unrealized opportunity, which can be
activated by various means, including from outside actors.
Synergy is something that governance should strive for but cre-
ating it is not easily accomplished, for the reasons explained
above. When synergy creation is highly problematic, it may be
referred to as a “wicked problem,” following the seminal article
of Rittel and Webber (Rittel and Webber 1973; Jentoft and
Chuenpagdee 2009).
We suggest that synergy should not be perceived in binary
terms, as something you have or do not have. Rather, it should be
looked at as a “gradient,” i.e., something that you can have more
or less of, and thus can be improved. Moving up the ladder from
weak to strong synergy requires initiatives and efforts in building
relationships, facilitating positive interactions and dissolving con-
flicts and tension. In a governance setting, this is partly an issue
of organization and leadership, which can be formal or informal,
present or absent (Micheli and Niccolini 2013). In small
communities where people interact with each other in several
capacities and roles, and therefore know each other frommultiple
encounters, relationships are inherently complex, which could
affect synergy, making the system more or less governable.
Even so, synergy can be fostered through other constructs such
as re-organization, new institutional rules, and facilitation of in-
formed interactions. Synergy can also be enhanced through in-
formal mechanisms, building on existing relationships.
Even small fishing communities, exemplified by La Restinga,
are systemsmade up of individual units and enterprises with their
own interests and agendas, which may be compatible or conflic-
tive, thus inhibiting synergy and affecting governability. These
units may form groups, with relationships and interactions inside
these groups or between them, which can be asymmetrical and
unequal. Governance for synergy creation must commence with
an analysis of how they add up and form a system of relation-
ships and interactions. It also needs to take into account the
existing institutional arrangements that may shape these interac-
tions. Time and effort are required to understand where people
stand on particular issues, what influences their behavior and
decision-making, and what their specific stakes are.
Further, synergy is contingent upon two other key character-
istics of systems, namely components and boundaries (Jentoft
and Chuenpagdee 2009), which may either foster or limit these
relationships and interactions. New actors can diversify the sys-
tem’s components and broaden its boundaries, thus, bringing
positive synergy, if their activities are compatible and symbiotic
with ongoing activities. On the other hand, in a small island
community, like La Restinga, the limited number of inhabitants
with specialized activities and restricted opportunities for expan-
sion may not be conducive to livelihood diversification, if it is a
necessary condition for synergy creation. In such circumstances,
creating synergy is a “wicked problem,” although not impossible
to overcome.
Although synergy creation is helpful for conflict resolution
and community survival, it is not necessarily a panacea for ev-
erything difficult and important in a community. Efforts to create
synergies may also become new sources of conflicts, worsen
therefore the situation. For instance, the relationships and the
interactions that generate synergy may be beneficial to some
while marginalizing others. Thus, while synergy is something
governance interventions should aim for, its creation must be
built on knowledge of the ecological, social, economic, and po-
litical systems and their connectivity and interaction. In the con-
text of La Restinga, this means that the MPA needs to be inves-
tigated as part of the larger whole, in order to detect potential for
synergy, and hence enhance governability.
Discovering synergies in La Restinga
The research on coastal communities in the Canary Islands
that has been ongoing for decades provides the background
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for the study of La Restinga. Anthropological field work in La
Restinga commenced in the mid-1980s to the early 1990s,
focusing on a range of topics including the establishment of
a fishers’ cooperative, fishers’ identity and livelihoods, and
local ecological knowledge (Galván Tudela 1997, 1990).
Beginning in the 2000s, the next wave of research was related
to the MPA that had been established in 1996. Research in La
Restinga is still ongoing, with added emphasis on crisis manage-
ment and resilience after the volcanic eruption. The focus of this
paper, on the role of theMPA in fostering synergies, emerges out
of the cumulative knowledge that has been built up about La
Restinga and other communities in the Canary Islands. In effect,
the paper does not result from a case study particularly designed
to examine synergies in La Restinga. Rather, it is a synthesis that
draws on previous research and reflects our observations of the
kinds of transformations that have occurred in La Restinga and
beyond in recent decades. Notably, this paper is also a theoretical
contribution to the discussion about the role of synergies for
conservation and governability. The research activities and the
key projects that have been carried out in the area, including the
methods employed, are summarized in Table 2 in Appendix 1.
Brief history of La Restinga
Founded in the 1940s, La Restinga is situated in the southwest of
the island of El Hierro, the smallest and the least populated
among the seven islands that form the Canary Island archipelago.
Originally dependent on agriculture, cattle raising and fisheries,
the economy of El Hierro is presently based on the services
sector, with tourism playing an important role, especially in an
area known as the Sea of Calms,1 which has become an increas-
ingly popular scuba diving destination in the last two decades
(De la CruzModino and Pascual-Fernández 2013). Although the
number of jobs in agriculture and fisheries is low, these produc-
tive activities make important contribution to the local economy
and have enjoyed a historically strong institutional support.
Besides, many families combine these activities with other jobs
in the service sector, having therefore supplementary income.
Since 2000, the population of La Restinga has increased slightly
from 443 to 541 inhabitants (Data: ISTAC, see Appendix 2).
The fishing history of La Restinga began with fishers fleeing
the crisis of the fishing industry in La Gomera, the other island in
the archipelago, during the SecondWorldWar and the Francoist2
repression. Tough conditions marked the origin of this commu-
nity, which also suffered from successive years of drought. The
situation improved at the end of the 1950s, when some tuna
canning enterprises became interested in the area, and started to
buy local catches, installed an ice factory, provided loans to the
local fishers to upgrade their boats, and created a stable market
for the local tuna production (De la CruzModino 2012). In 1968,
fishers became organized and a local cofradía3 was created
(Galván Tudela 1997), serving to channel many of the demands
from fishers to higher authorities, the first of which was asking
for a fishing harbor for winter activities.
Small-scale fisheries
Traditionally, fishing in the Sea of Calms involved small boats
(4–6 m) propelled with engines. After the fishing harbor was
built in 1988, many small-scale fishers invested in larger boats
(10–13 m). However, the maintenance cost of these larger boats
and the diminishing catches of tuna forced many to reduce the
size of their boat to 7–8 m for operation in inshore areas. These
boats are technologically well equipped, safe, easy to maintain,
and versatile for multi-gear, multi-species fisheries.
Except for hook and line that targets a wide range of species,
other common gears used in the area are selective. For instance,
harpoon is used to catch peto (wahoo, Acanthocybium solandri),
small cylindrical pots formorenas (moray eel,Muraenidae), pots
for shrimp, and puyón for catching vieja (parrotfish, Sparisoma
cretense). In terms of income, vieja brings in about 23% of the
total, followed by peto and alfunsiño (red bream, Beryx
decadactylus) at 21 and 14% respectively.
In 2017, 36 fishers were active on the island. Thirty were in
La Restinga, operating 31 boats, organized into 23 small-scale
fishery productive units, each with one to four fishers depending
on the fishery. In the last 5 years, seven new young fishers started
to work in La Restinga replacing the retirement of older fishers,
making it one of the youngest fisher’ populations in the entire
Canary Island archipelago.
In terms of governance, fisheries are generally managed by
the cofradía. The cooperative,Pescarestinga, is also instrumental
in making fishing a viable livelihood. Its foundation was moti-
vated by a conflict that fishers had with a powerful middleman
who controlled the price and the amount of fish that they could
catch (Galván Tudela 1990). Not all members of the cofradía
join the cooperative. Leaders of both organizations have always
been different and the governing body of the cofradía normally
includes a balanced number of representatives of Pescarestinga
and other fishers.
Pescarestinga manages all landings of 17 productive units
and organizes their sale. Most of these catches are sold outside
of El Hierro, mainly in Tenerife, and a good percentage in La
1 This name is due to the good weather prevailing in the maritime area, as the
mountains of the island protect the zone from the dominant winds during
almost all the year.
2 It refers to a period from the end of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939),
when the authoritarian dictator Francisco Franco took control of the Spanish
Government until his death in 1975.
3 Cofradías are local non-profit public corporations, which represent the inter-
ests of the whole fishing sector by acting “as consultative and cooperative
bodies for the administration, undertaking economic, administrative, and com-
mercial management tasks” and with the ability to “cooperate in matters of
regulating access to the resources and informing about infringements occur-
ring in their territory” (Pascual-Fernández 1999). They have played an impor-
tant role in the implementation of MPAs in Spain.
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Restinga, to local restaurants and bars, some of which are owned
by fishing families. A small minority of fishers who are not
members of Pescarestinga sell their own catches among restau-
rants, middlemen, or other networks.
Tourism development
In the early 1960s, a few restaurants and tourist apartments were
built and catered for vacationers, many of them come from the
other islands. Some of the businesses were owned and operated
by fishing families, for whom tourism became an additional
source of livelihood and income. Women, in particular, were
heavily involved in tourism accommodation and related services,
especially since the inception of Pescarestinga, which had min-
imized their roles in post-harvest activities. They also have a
strong presence in the local catering sector. Currently, female
members of over 70% of fishing families are engaged in tourism
services during the high season, thus gaining additional income
for their households (De la CruzModino and Pascual-Fernández
2005). In 1996, when the MPAwas established, there were 200
lodging beds in La Restinga, including apartments and holiday
homes. Today, there are more than 800 beds, the majority of
which are still managed by local women, using social relation-
ships in the neighborhoods, in the absence of any tour-operator.
Tourism constitutes an important economic supplement for
fishing families. Apartments were built by men, while women
have beenworking in bars, supermarkets, and restaurants, as well
as running the rental and the maintenance of the tourist apart-
ments. In contrast to what other studies have reported (e.g.,
Gustavsson et al. 2014), these tourism-related activities offer a
stable market for small-scale fisheries production in La Restinga.
In 1968, a German entrepreneur started the first scuba
diving business, consisting of a boarding house with a res-
taurant, where only his family members were employed.
Villagers were not involved in this early scuba diving busi-
ness development. It was not until the 1990s that other
scuba diving entrepreneurs, from mainland Spain, ap-
peared in the village using existing apartments, boarding
houses, and restaurants managed by the local women. This
change improved the perception of local villagers regard-
ing the scuba diving tourism. The number of diving centers
increased from 3 in 1996 to 9 in 2005, when a regulation
on the number of divers inside the MPA was approved.
Nowadays, there are 10 diving centers in La Restinga (in-
cluding one multi-adventure enterprise offering other tour-
ism activities), operating inside the MPA. Despite this de-
velopment, there are some clear constraints for tourism
expansion on the island. For instance, traveling to El
Hierro and La Restinga is difficult and expensive, with
only one small airport, and with restricted archipelago mar-
itime connections. Limited tourism amenities and poor
standard of some services add to the challenges.
The Sea of Calms and the MPA
Both fishing and tourism development generate ecological
concerns in the area, especially in the extremely biologically
diverse area, the Sea of Calms. The island has a very narrow
continental shelf, with a steep slope very close to the coast,
constituting a potentially fragile coastal ecosystem with high
diversity of species but low in biomass. This structure, along
with the warm sea surface temperature (21 °C annual aver-
age), offers great potential for scuba diving and other recrea-
tional activities.
Local fishers and the cofradía have always been aware of the
fragility of the ecosystem and, with the backing of the national
and regional fisheries administration and the University of La
Laguna (Tenerife), had taken decisions in the past to ban several
kinds of fishing gear in all the island such as trammel, fish pots,
and long-lines (De la Cruz Modino 2012). During the 1990s,
fishers were also concerned about the decline in tuna fisheries
and the increased fishing effort on benthic species. They consid-
ered that it would be a good strategy to protect the benthic re-
sources in the Sea of Calms using a tool such as anMPA4 (Jentoft
et al. 2012). They wanted, however, to maintain some control
over the design and the implementation, and, thus, insisted on
being represented on the governing board, alongwith other local,
regional, and scientific institutions.
The initial proposal for a protected area came from researchers
at the end of 1980s, but was rejected by fishers because of the
top-down process and the disagreement about where it should be
located. Years after, the cofradía came up with consideringMPA
as a possibility and discussed it among fishers and scientists, later
with policy-makers. Finally, the protected area received support
from the majority of fishers and the area was declared a “marine
reserve with fishing interest” in 1996. Some fishers opposed the
idea because they were not convinced of the benefits. Over time,
however, they have recognized the advantages of the MPA. In
addition to addressing the decline in tuna fisheries and reducing
pressure on other species, the MPA also aims at limiting tourism
activities in the area. The basic information about the MPA is
summarized in Table 1 (see also Fig. 1).
The zoning system shown in Fig. 1 was extensively discussed
during the design process, but without participation from scuba
diving enterprises. They became involved in the MPA gover-
nance mainly after the volcanic crisis (Jentoft et al. 2012).
Further details of the social and economic context of La
Restinga can be found in appendix 2 with Figs. 2, 3, 4 and 5.
4 We lack space in this paper to provide details about the establishment and the
implementation of thisMPA. Some of our previous publications describe these
processes (De la Cruz Modino and Pascual-Fernández 2013; Jentoft et al.
2012; De la Cruz Modino 2012; Pascual-Fernandez and De la Cruz Modino
2011)
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The 2011 volcanic eruption and future development
The current analysis cannot be considered complete without not-
ing the earthquakes and underwater eruption that struck the Sea
of Calms in 2011, disrupting fishing and tourism activities in El
Hierro, and especially in La Restinga (Pérez et al. 2013). The
volcanic activity in the area increased in September–October
2011 and eventually, the village of La Restinga had to be evac-
uated for a brief period. Navigation, scuba diving, and fishing
were either banned or severely limited for a long period, with the
eruption remaining active until March 5, 2012. For months, the
boats were moved from La Restinga harbor to other areas of the
island. The volcano occurred right in the middle of the MPA,
destroying the majority of the marine life there. Urged by the
cofradía, a temporary ban on fishing in the most affected area
was announced. Small-scale fishers received monetary compen-
sation from the state for the inactivity during most of this period.
These subsidies created some controversy because small-scale
fishers clearly received more support compared to other sectors
on the Island, despite the fact that the scuba diving centers were
also in a vulnerable position. They made attempts to carry on
their diving activities in different areas, but with limited success.
Moving to other areas of the island was not easy, as the environ-
mental conditions elsewhere are not as suitable for year-round
business, and travel logistics are complicated. All diving enter-
prises stopped their activities in the area during the volcanic
activity, but as of summer 2012, they have returned to La
Restinga to resume their businesses.
The temporary ban in El Hierro MPAwas not well received
by a large group of recreational fishers and business associations.
One of their arguments was that limiting recreational fishing
could reduce the number of tourists at a time of economic crisis.
Recreational fishers took to the streets in the main town on the
Island, which led to modifications of some restrictions (Pascual
Fernández et al. 2015). In this instance, the new president of the
Cabildo (Island government) sided with the recreational sector,
breaking a long tradition of cooperationwith professional fishers.
The impact of this natural hazard on tourism in El Hierro was
huge, as the seismic movements were widely publicized by me-
dia, discouraged thus visitors and affected the already fragile
industries due to increasing transportation difficulties. The num-
ber of tourists went down by about 20%, from approximately
17,000 in 2009 to around 13,000 in 2013 (ISTAC, http://goo.gl/
8Mxi3p). These estimates are conservative as the majority of the
tourist accommodation on the island is informal and thus is not
included in the official statistics.
The fishing ban ended inMarch 2013, but recreational fishers
and scuba divers continue to demand inclusion in decision-
making related to fisheries and ecosystem management. Such
inclusion is critical given the possibility of establishing a
Marine National Park in the area. Since 2014, this proposal is
undergoing consideration by the national government, the
Cabildo (Island government), municipalities, the cofradía, and
a variety of civil society organizations in El Hierro. It is again
opposed by the same group of recreational fishers, fearing that
the marine park will lead to additional restrictions. And once
Table 1 General information about the La Restinga MPA
Key features Details
Year established and decrees 1996 (National Government Ministerial Order of 24 January 1996
and Regional Government Decree 30/1996 of February 16)
Implementation 1998–1999
Depth range 0–400 m
Habitats Rocky reefs, caves, sandy substrates
Main objectives Fisheries enhancement and conservation
Management body Comisión de Gestión y Seguimiento (Advisory body) / Comisión de Control
Responsibility Shared between national and regional governments
General services Surveillance/visitors center
Scientist and management activities Signposting of diving points, monitoring of underwater activities,
monitoring of angling from the shore, collaboration in research projects
Activities forbidden in all MPA Anchoring, recreational fishing by boat, spear fishing, scuba diving
with propulsion systems, extractive uses other than those allowed
Zone classification Core Buffer Multiple uses
Size (Ha) 180 90 480
Uses allowed Small-scale tuna fishing when a shoal




from the shore/other recreational uses
Gears allowed Pole and line for tuna
fishery exclusively
Hook and line gears,
tuna fishery gears,
harpoon for wahoo
Hook and line gears, tuna fishery gears,
harpoon, traps for shrimps, traps for
moray, nets for bait and for shoals of
Salma salpa
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more, their position draws support from the president of the
Cabildo (Pascual Fernández et al. 2015).
Discussion
LaRestinga and itsMPA should be examined, first and foremost,
as a governing system made up of institutions and organizations
as well as a system-to-be-governed, comprising the nature itself
and a diverse set of interacting individuals, organizations, and
stakeholder groups (Kooiman et al. 2005). It is within these sys-
tems that synergies emerge, often as a direct outcome of internal
or external interventions, such as the introduction of an MPA
(Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009). These synergies are created
from the relationships and interactions that exist in the commu-
nity. They also emerge from the opportunities that the MPA
generates.
The following discussion is organized according to the four
distinct properties, which according to interactive governance
theory are the key characteristics of any governance system.
Whereas components refer to the natural and social entities (like
species and social actors) that make up the system, relationships
are about linkages between components, for instances the roles
and rules that connect them and govern their interactions. The
latter refers to the dynamic performance of the entities within
their constitutive relationships. Boundaries define which compo-
nents belong to the system. They also exist where relationships
are weakened and interactions dwindled, as for example through
the MPA zoning.
Components
La Restinga has most of the elements that make up a thriving
small-scale fisheries community. Here, fishing is the backbone of
the local economy, and other activities have developed tangen-
tially to it. Our research indicates that the MPA, while adding
complexity, diversity, and new dynamics to the local community,
is nevertheless well integrated into the local social and economic
fabric. Furthermore, it has led to economic diversification with-
out the fishing community losing control of their resources or the
power to self-govern. In effect, the MPA is a value-added com-
ponent to the La Restinga community, serving as an inducement
for small-scale fisheries and local tourism operations to grow. As
such, the system-to-be-governed, within which the MPA is
placed, does not need to face conflicts that are common else-
where, where MPAs are misfits.
From a conservation perspective, no-take zones may be the
ideal way to preserve and restore a pristine environment. This
assumes that humans are not a “natural” element of the ecosys-
tem, and that their activities pose a risk to conservation. While
Fig. 1 Marine Reserve of La Restinga and the Sea of Calms (map by Alberto Jonay Rodríguez Darias)
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prohibiting the access and the use ofMPAs configured as no-take
zones seems sensible to some, this can be clearly contradicted in
many empirical cases (Voyer et al. 2014; Lopes et al. 2013,
2015). Removing humans from nature, and thus denying them
access to their livelihoods, is likely to cause conflict and trigger
opposition to the implementation of an MPA. Thinking more
broadly about who among the stakeholders can be part of an
essential alliance to work on compromises may be necessary to
enhance MPA governability. This implies that an MPA does not
need to be the hub, around which everything in the community
revolves, but could be an added component for synergy creation,
if well embedded into a comprehensive and balanced system.
In fact, insisting on conservation goals without a willingness
to incorporate interests and perspectives of local stakeholders
may easily stand in the way of obtaining synergies. As shown
in La Restinga, the MPA never rejected the needs of the local
fishing community and the rights of access that fishers as its first
citizens could legitimately claim. As a consequence, fishers were
also motivated to support the ecological agenda, becoming a
constructive force in making the MPAwork, rather than an ad-
versary and obstacle. The formal branding of the MPA “for fish-
ing interest” emphasizes the synergy that has been achieved be-
tween conservation and fisheries. The MPA in La Restinga is
designed to serve multiple purposes, including but not exclusive-
ly local fishers (Jentoft et al. 2012). The fishing interest is
protected through the leadership of the cofradía, with its strong
presence on the governing board of theMPA. The strength of the
integration of the MPA into the local and social fabric could be
exemplified by thinking about what could have happened in their
absence. As seen in many other areas of the archipelago (Couce-
Montero et al. 2015), having noMPA in the areawould imply the
lack of surveillance in the area, the intensification of uncontrolled
fishing activities, and the degradation of the local ecosystem. It
could also put in peril the livelihoods of small-scale fishing peo-
ple and compromise the growth of scuba diving and tourist ac-
tivities in the area.
Relationships
La Restinga demonstrates the value of multi-stranded relation-
ships and linkages in the success of place-based management
tools likeMPAs for creating synergy. Building amore diversified
local economy by adding other activities and enterprises to the
fisheries contributes to making the community less fisheries de-
pendent but still maintaining fishing culture and tradition. In La
Restinga, many of these diversification initiatives have come
from people and institutions within the community, while others
have arisen from non-local people, such as with the first scuba
diving centers and those that followed. The spin-offs from the
MPA and these new economic opportunities to the community
include economic benefits to spouses and other members of fish-
ing families. Thus, besides fishing, family income is drawn from
other sources like restaurants, stores, and hostels that have been
established to help build a viable small-scale tourism industry in
the community (Lopes et al. 2015). In some instances, family
members have jobs that are directly related to the MPA, as
guards, or indirectly related like working in tourist information
points centered on the natural values of the area.
The lessons from La Restinga also demonstrate the advantage
of complementarity—“when A does X, B can do Y, and there-
fore C can do Z”— as within a symbiotic relationship where
different activities, including the MPA, create spin-off opportu-
nities without competition.When A fishes around and within the
MPA, thus directly benefiting from its ecosystem services (X), B
can run a fish restaurant (Y) using fish from A. Furthermore, this
fish restaurant can be useful to scuba diving enterprises (C),
which may recommend this quality food to their clients (Z), thus
increasing the demand for fish from A. This is a local scenario,
where a simple market mechanism constitutes a win-win situa-
tion. But transactions run more smoothly when people know and
trust each other and are mutually concerned that they should all
benefit, also for the sake of building their community. In La
Restinga, like in many other places, this is only partially the case
because conflicts at the interpersonal levelmay inhibit themarket
from running smoothly. In such a community, transactions occur
between actors that are involved in complex relationships where
the role of buyers and sellers cannot be easily separated from
other roles and affinities that people have towards each other.
In general, synergy (S) occurs “whenA doesX, B doesY, and
C does Z, and together they can also do S.” People in small
communities may be more capable of realizing such a synergic
potential by doing things that those in a competitive and adverse
relationship would not be able to. La Restinga is closer to the
former, but not free from the latter. Although a small, tightly knit
community, it is not idyllic and homogeneous with all members
cooperating equally. For instance, tension occurs because of the
strong position that small-scale fishers have relative to other
groups, particularly scuba diving operators.
When the initial idea about theMPAwas launched, it wasmet
with skepticism within the community and among local fishers.
Later, and especially after the son of a local fishing family study-
ing marine biology and a university professor became involved
in the discussion, the proposal was welcomed by the local fishers
and the Cofradía. It made a big difference who the messengers
were and how people in the community related to them
(Gonzalez and Jentoft 2011). For synergy to occur, it not only
matters what people do but also who they are relative to each
other.
Interactions
La Restinga demonstrates the importance of checks and bal-
ances. Obviously, the community needs stable and predictable
conditions, and opportunities to assert their power over the run-
ning of local affairs, including the MPA. There is a risk that
someone might “highjack” the MPA agenda if there is no
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mechanism to enable local stakeholders to become part of the
governing system (Jentoft et al. 2011; Segi 2014). In La
Restinga, the cofradía provides the mechanism for the local fish-
ers to make decisions about what the MPA should be and do.
Other stakeholders do not have similar organizations to represent
their interests. Certainly, as definitive stakeholders, the small-
scale fishers of La Restinga would have a high score in power,
urgency, and legitimacy criteria due to their permanent residency
status (Buanes et al. 2004). They did, after all, create the com-
munity in the first place. The fact that many diving entrepreneurs
camemuch later, from abroad, and do not usually stay long in the
community, may explain their difficulties in becoming integrated
into the community.
Tension between local fishers and diving entrepreneurs or
external tourist operators is to be expected (Fabinyi 2008). But
the “weak ties” that outsiders and newcomers have to the com-
munity can be a positive force, as suggested generally by
Granovetter (1973). In fact, it seems that after the volcanic crisis,
their interaction with the cofradía has improved. The confronta-
tion with some recreational fishers because of the fishing ban
promoted by La Restinga fishers after the volcano may facilitate
the confluence of interests between small-scale fishers and diving
centers. Interestingly, those families in La Restinga that have a
foot in both the fishery and tourism business coped better with
the crisis caused by the eruption than those who only relied on
one type of activity, such as scuba diving.
As a general lesson for the formation of an embedded and
synergisticMPA, onewhich links up to a larger system, it matters
which interactions take place. In La Restinga, despite some mi-
nor strains with outsiders, these linkages have not led to external
domination; instead fishers have received support from scientists,
civil servants in key positions, and lately, by environmental or-
ganizations. For this reason, some of these actors are using La
Restinga as an example to be imitated in other areas of Spain.
Boundaries
Can MPAs help build symbiosis and synergies, if their locations
and boundaries are contested? To answer this key question, one
needs to investigate the extent and intensity of ongoing activities
both within the area and beyond. Further, as Chuenpagdee et al.
(2013) emphasize, this question needs to be extended to the pre-
implementation or the “step zero” stage. While for the most part,
it is the system-to-be-governed that calls for the creation of an
MPA, eachMPA system is unique and needs to be looked at and
understood on its own terms, before the perimeters can be set.
This process, even if done through participatorymapping, should
not be the first exercise, but something that comes once the
knowledge about the system, particularly about social bound-
aries, has been established.
While zoning may help minimize spatial competition, it often
creates other kinds of conflict. MPAs are therefore difficult to set
up, as they easily trigger local resistance among those who fear
that their action space might be restricted (Hoffman 2014). Thus,
spatial demarcation is not a geo-technical issue or a mapping
exercise, although that can be part of it. Demarcation also raises
issues regarding social justice pertaining to differential access
within the MPA, for instance between commercial and recrea-
tional fishing and scuba diving, as in La Restinga. MPAs are
therefore also political, and as discussed elsewhere, they raise
problems that are inherently “wicked” (Jentoft and
Chuenpagdee 2009).
MPAs are clearly direct interventions into relationships and
interactions between various stakeholders and uses. In a situation
when “stakeholder A does X, B cannot do Y,” A and B are in a
competitive, zero-sum game where more space for one means
less for the other. Considering that space is scarce, and one type
of resource use may limit the use of others, keeping them apart
through some kind of boundary setting or working out rules for
how to share the same space, should help avoid conflicts (Jentoft
2017).
However, whether different uses are inherently antagonistic
and/or “parasitic,” unable to co-exist or incapable of cooperating
and compromising, is an issue to be explored when MPAs are
crafted and boundaries are drawn.On closer inspection, however,
this may not really be the case. In La Restinga, the conflict
between different users was avoidable, and the synergies can
be easily exemplified. For instance, fishers in La Restinga agreed
to protect and not fish an emblematic grouper, named the “Mero
Pancho,” as a way of collaborating with divers in the area. This
extremely large grouper was at one time a symbol for the MPA,
covered widely by media, and an attraction for incoming divers.
In the end, the local economy and their families have benefited
from it. This may come as a surprise to those who see MPAs as
just a tool for securing the integrity of marine ecosystems, and
also to those who do not believe in a win-win situation.
Unfortunately and to the dismay of fishers and divers, Mero
Pancho disappeared from the area some years ago. Some divers
from other islands who came with spearguns were blamed for
this, but nothing could be demonstrated. In this case, the bound-
aries and rules assumed and respected by the locals were not
recognized by outsiders or poachers. The incident reaffirms the
importance of boundaries and the need to improve relationships
and interactions between local stakeholders.
Generally speaking, as a lesson from this particular case, a
workable system-to-be governed, of which the MPA is part,
along with other activities like tourism, must be an open system
for synergy to be created. It must allow its boundaries to be
permeated and work across scales. It must let itself be exposed
to external influences, because they often come with resources
and new opportunities for building a more complete system and
therefore a thriving fishing community, like LaRestinga has been
achieved (cf. also (Bennett and Dearden 2014; Hassanali 2013).
The introduction of the Marine National Park will broaden the
area under protection but may also make the usability of the area
more complex.
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Conclusion
This paper draws from long-term research programs on coast-
al communities in the Canary Islands. Synergies have been
observed in these places but not theorized until now.
Synergy creation is not restricted to MPAs. Rather, other in-
stitutional frameworks like Integrated Coastal Zone
Management (ICZM) may benefit and learn from using this
concept and by placing some focus on synergy creation.
Connection between synergy and other frameworks like social
innovation (van der Have and Rubalcaba 2016) can also be
conceptually explored.
Whether existing or potential, synergy is a dynamic quality of
the system-to-be-governed and the governing system, as well as
an outcome of the interactions and relationships between them.
Some levels of diversity and complexity are imperative to syn-
ergy creation: these are features of the systems where MPAs are
introduced and operate. Coupling diversity with complexity to
build integrated and interactive systems of individual compo-
nents makes communities less vulnerable. This does not contra-
dict the importance of specialized competencies of individual
system components (e.g., fishing, scuba diving and restaurants,
in La Restinga). As Chadwick (2010) holds, the highest potential
for creating synergy (and hence improving governability) is
when components have both specialized competencies and
strong relationships. It could be argued that individual speciali-
zation helps form buffer against systemic collapse, as effects can
be isolated to individual components. But from a governability
perspective, symbiotic relationships between specialized compo-
nents are likely to lead to improving governability and to a speed-
ier recovery from disaster, like the volcanic eruption in La
Restinga. Individual actions and collaboration can create expo-
nential growth through synergistic spin-offs. This does not have
to be a spontaneous process but one that requires negotiated
institutional arrangements that facilitate cooperation and joint
decision-making. This is something that should be considered
when moving forward with the plan to establish the new
Marine National Park for El Hierro.
MPAs bring uncertainty to the community, as no one can
predict their outcomes. This sense of insecurity can be met, how-
ever, with more stakeholder involvement and greater transparen-
cy, as stakeholders must know what is going on. They must
understand how they are linked to the system as a whole, how
they are affected both directly and indirectly from outside their
immediate surroundings, and what threats and opportunities for
synergy creation exist. Relationships must allow interactions that
inform people about the relevance of each other’s undertakings.
MPAs cannot therefore remain isolated from the rest of the com-
munity, and the community cannot be ignorant about what is
happening to and within an MPA. This calls for MPAs to be
embedded as entities that fit within a greater whole. This is pre-
cisely what makes La Restinga stand out in comparison with
many other MPAs in Spain and elsewhere.
Synergies, as the case of La Restinga exemplifies, are
not developed in a vacuum. It is possible to highlight
some conditions that facilitated the development of syn-
ergies in this example. The marine ecosystem, while frag-
ile, has provided long-term subsistence to a close-knitted
fishing community. The local collective actions and strong
leaderships, first in the cofradía and later in the coopera-
tive, enabled effective resource management and the cre-
ation of the MPA. No less important was the partnership
developed between community, fisher organizations, sci-
entists, and the administration (local, regional, and nation-
al). Since its inception, the clear access rules and the sur-
veillance service contributed to fisheries compliance.
Finally, the slow pace of tourism development, due partly
to the remoteness of the Island, fostered the linkages be-
tween local fishing families and the service sector,
resulting eventually in favorable outcomes for all stake-
holders, including the late comers like the scuba diving
business.
Our analysis shows that MPAs, ICZM, and other spatial
planning approaches should be less about demarcation and
separation but more about building symbiosis between activ-
ities, aligning with the characteristics of the natural and social
systems. Communities are not just zero-sum games but cer-
tainly have the potential to transform competition and conflict
into relationships, characterized by cooperation and synergy.
Such transformation has to be facilitated since moving beyond
the individual interests of involved parties in a way that im-
proves interactions and builds relations is not an easy task, as
the La Restinga example shows. The well-being of local
communities and the functionality of the entire governance
systems should be incorporated as part of the strategy to
create synergy. The strategy should also, as Kooiman (2003)
states for interactive governance, include caring for the institu-
tions that facilitate integration and coordination of activities for a
better dynamic and governability. This would help strengthening
communities and prepare them for shocks, as happened in La
Restinga with the volcanic eruption. A community must have
mechanisms and institutions that foster relationships and interac-
tions that enable local people as well as newcomers to sort out
their differences and to pull together, which LaRestinga has in its
cooperative (Pescarestinga), the cofradía and, indeed, in the
MPA.
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